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The CFSP in synergetic theorising:  Explaining the CFSP 
 via a multi-causal and multi-level analytical model
♦ 
 
 
Maciej Wilga
 ♣ 
 
 
Abstract 
Usually, theoretical approaches and/or analytical models used in the study of the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are build on ‘uni-
causal influences’ and on just one ‘level of analysis’. No doubt, such perspectives 
are parsimonious and elegant in their character. However, they exclude important 
elements in the CFSP’s existence and development. By doing so, they are narrow in 
their  analytical  scope.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  CFSP  is  a  complex  object  of 
analysis, requiring complex analytical models. 
This paper offers a new, multi-causal and multi-level framework based on three 
integration theories each for one relevant level of analysis. The model, so goes the 
argument,  can  account  for  significant  factors  that  influence  the  institutional 
development of the CFSP. By this example, complex analytical frameworks, as the 
paper  argues,  are  necessary  both  in  order  to  better  manage  the  examinations  of 
complex  subject  matters  and  in  order  to  fully  explain  their  institutional 
developments. 
 
 
Kay words:  European integration, International relations, European Integration theories, synergetic 
theorising, analytical model, Common Foreign and Security Policy institutions 
 
Introduction  
 
The body of the Common, Foreign and Security Policy’s (CFSP) ‘acquis académique’ as well as 
its ‘acquis institutionnel’ is impressive.
1 Major contemporary scholars approach CFSP theoretical 
analyses from very different directions. This appears to hold true both in the ‘conceptualisations 
of ‘European foreign policy’ [EFP], and in the types of explanatory analysis contained in these 
studies’ (Carlsnaes 2004: 15). Hence, could novel synthesising approaches have the potential to 
remedy this problem? 
                                                           
     
♦  A modified version of this paper was presented at the Dalhousie University Conference on The EU as a Global 
Actor, May 5-6, 2008, Halifax, Canada. 
     
♣  Maciej  Wilga  (PhD  2007,  University  of  Southern  Denmark,  Odense)  studied  Political  Science  and  English 
Philology  at  the  University  of  Potsdam/Germany  (1999),  and  European  Integration  and  International  Relations as 
postgraduate study programme at the Institut Européen des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Nice/France, which he 
concluded with a Postgraduate Diploma in 2000. 
       His recent position was Head of Office of COPURA in Brussels (2007). Other positions include those at the federal 
secretariat of the European Movement Germany in Berlin (2000-2001), as Deputy Chief Editor for the Polish “Political 
Affairs  Quarterly”  (1999-2002),  Lecturer  at  the  Department  of  Political  Science  and  Public  Management  of  the 
University of Southern Denmark in Odense, Denmark (2002-2004), and as Visiting Researcher at the Department of 
Politics, International Relations and European Studies at Loughborough University in United Kingdom (2003).  
     
1 A systematic and thorough presentation of the state of the art in the field of EI studies is provided by Rosamond 
(2000) and by Wiener and Diez (2004), and for IR by Viotti and Kauppi (1993), Baylis and S. Smith (1999) and 
Burchill et. al (2001).  
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  Researching this possibility and applying it to foreign policy cooperation in the European 
Union (EU) can be an interesting but challenging task because EU foreign policy today is a 
‘complex mixture and interplay of many elements’ (Mahncke 2004: 27). This complexity may 
give raise to problems for uni-causal integration theories that are often used in studies of the 
CFSP or of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
  Although EU member states have traditionally and collectively decided constitutional issues 
of  the  CFSP  in  successive  presidencies  and  Intergovernmental  Conferences  (IGCs),  different 
theories concentrated on different actors and on different levels of analysis. Indeed, the ongoing 
institutionalisation and institutional built-up of foreign policy management in the EU (Peterson 
1995,  2001)  have  been  due  to  the  history-making  decisions  taken  by m ember  states.  This 
continues to be the main empirical focus in the studies of the CFSP.  
  By  focusing  on  this  main  actor,  this  text  offers  a  new,  multi-causal  and  multi-level 
framework based on three integration theories for each relevant level of analysis. The model 
proposed here accounts for significant factors which influence the institutional development of 
the CFSP. This text argues that complex analytical frameworks are necessary both to manage 
examinations  of  complex  subject  matters  and  also  to  fully  explain  their  institutional 
developments. 
  After identifying three main integration theories as prominent examples of uni-causality, 
this text offers a way to transcend them. It then identifies dimensions for a synergetic CFSP 
analysis  and  proceeds f rom  dimensions  to  analytical  sequences,  thereby  highlighting  the 
complementarity of selected integration theories. Subsequently, the chosen theories are placed in 
analytical sequences of the model in order to systematically develop model-based expectations 
for  the  CFSP  development.  Finally,  and  based  on  this  new  synergy,  some  hypothetical 
expectations are formulated. 
 
The CFSP in three integration theories: examples of uni-causality  
 
What  theories  are  relevant  to  research  on  the  CFSP?  This  depends  largely  on  the  research 
question asked. A plethora of different EI and IR theories have been related to this field of study,
2 
of which three are briefly assessed here.  
 To limit the assessment to three integration theories, they must be ‘in accordance’ with the 
main research question, i.e. they have to be able to give theoretical answers to the question of 
why  the  CFSP  institutional  development  progresses  and  must  address  change  in  CFSP 
cooperation. In other words, a theory needs to be able to account for dynamic alterations about 
what has happened in foreign policy integration in the EC/EU over time. Additionally, such a 
theory must be able to propose independent variable(s) to account for such dynamics in the CFSP.  
 Certainly not all existing integration theories would score well on the above criteria. There 
are theories  and  approaches  that  can  explain  and  predict the  progressive  development  of the 
CFSP, while others are less suitable for that purpose. The main difference between them is that 
either they predict integration and argue that there is a possibility for an incremental process, or 
that such a possibility is not conceivable. In the latter case, one would speak of predicting and 
explaining absence rather than presence of integration.
3  
                                                           
    
2 For an overview about EI and IR theories, see footnote 1. Additional interesting overviews are provided by Jackson 
and Sørensen (2003) and Burchill et. al (2001). 
    
3  In the  light  of the  above,  not  all theories  are  equally  appropriate.  For  example, the  Multi  Level  Governance 
approach, while suitable for studying the complexity of ‘EU foreign policy’, is much less capable of explaining the 
constitutional changes in the CFSP. The MLG approach would have difficulties explaining why the member states took 
these or other constitutional decisions in the CFSP. The key critique addressed towards the MLG approach is that it can 
only be applied to analyse multi-level policy structures at a point when they exist. The emergence of these structures, in 
this case the CFSP, lies beyond the MLG approach.  
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  In relation to the individual theories, the modified neorealist theory (MNR) – with its basic 
assumptions which are derived from the classical neorealist research agenda – is first as the 
closest  to  the  main  actors  analysed.  Nevertheless,  the  MNR  only  focuses  on  international 
(external) stimuli, and can therefore only single out the structure of the international relations and 
the existing security pressures as variables. As some scholars argued, the CFSP was baptised by 
fire (Ginsberg 2001), which indicates a clear instance of security pressures.  
  While the above is true, it is a shortcut in explaining the ESDP since such an argument 
ignores both the European and the domestic level of analysis. Briefly, the MNR only places its 
argument on the international level of analysis and therefore fails to include the European and the 
states’  (domestic)  level  (see  table  1).  Given  this  limitation,  how  could  one  expect  a  full 
explanation of the CFSP institutional development, if these important dimensions are ignored? 
Thus, the MNR application is a clear instance of uni-causal analysis. 
  Concerning the neofunctionalist (NF) elements, notwithstanding the difficulties with the 
spill-over mechanism, neofunctionalism has been a dynamic approach that tried to explain the 
change in the ongoing development of integration. Since spill-over today touches upon ‘high 
politics’ as well, the neofunctionalist pressures that exist within the European system can also be 
analysed.  However,  neofunctionalism  normally  works  in  relation  to  supranational  actors. 
Therefore, it would need an operationalisation for a synergetic CFSP model. Thus, unlike the 
tenets of classical neofunctionalism, the main actors responsible for channelling those forces into 
the  final  form  of  the  CFSP  are  the  EU  member  states  and  not  the  Commission  and/or  the 
European Parliament. As Mahncke posits, 
 
     one could simply cite the neo-functionalist logic of ‘spill-over’ as a reason for CFSP’s coming into 
being. Accordingly, The CFSP would have developed almost automatically, as ‘spill-over’ from other 
developments.  Integration  in  trade  and  increasing  interdependence  in  a  multitude  of  other  areas, 
including numerous aspects of foreign policy, would have made a common foreign and security policy 
all but inevitable. However, this view would practically attribute member states the role of bystanders, 
which eventually has not been the case (Mahncke 2004: 39). 
 
This is why the NF variables need to be adapted adequately with the EU member states as the 
main actors. The focus on the EU member states as the primary addressees of the neofunctionalist 
pressures at the European level provide here an access to study the NF-based pressures. Despite 
such an operationalisation, the problem of the level of analysis persists here since NF bases its 
argument only on the European level of analysis and therefore ignores the other two relevant 
dimensions (see table 1). Again, when two relevant levels of analysis are not included, how can 
one expect a full explanation of the CFSP development? This is why NF is another example of 
uni-causal CFSP examination.  
 
Table 1: Theories and their levels of analysis 
 
Theory/approach 
 
Actors focused on 
 
Level of analysis 
 
Missing level of analysis 
 
MNR  member states  international  domestic, European 
NF  European 
institutions   European  domestic, international 
LI  member states  domestic, European   international 
Source: Compiled by the author   
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        A  similar  argument  can  also  be  used  with  regard  to  liberal  intergovernmentalism  (LI). 
Although it primarily applies to states as the main actors, and this does not pose any problem for 
a synergetic analysis, as it only focuses on them. It is interesting that Moravcsik also concedes 
neo-‘functional incentives for institutionalization’ (Moravcsik 1993: 517). Concerning the level 
of analysis, LI poses its analysis on the domestic and European level, and thus the international 
level  is  also  ignored.  A  similar  question  could  thus  be  asked  about  why  a  liberal 
intergovernmentalist explanation of the CFSP could be complete, if one relevant level of analysis 
is excluded (see table 1)? Hence, LI could also be assessed as uni-causal in its character.  
  A clear overall implication seems to be that the selected individual theories conduct their 
respective analyses on different levels of analysis, but none of them on all levels at once, and 
hence their arguments and explanations cannot be complete. Given this short analysis, the main 
implication resulting from this logic is that any uni-causal, one-level-theory-approach, is doomed 
to be insufficient due to the large number of levels in the analysis of the CFSP. This points to the 
potential and the ‘viability’/‘vitality’ of synergetic analytical models, which may move this study 
field from single-approach explanations to fuller/complete synergetic explanations, especially in 
cases  when  the  object  of  analysis  so  requires.  Hence,  the  necessity  of  a  complementary, 
synergetic procedure with respect to an explanation of the dynamics of the CSFP institutional 
development is apparent.
4  
  Following  the  CFSP’s  dimensional  perspectives  (see  next  section),  frameworks  of  a 
synergetic nature, which fulfil minimal scientific requirements and are able to grasp and analyse 
the overall dynamics of the CFSP’s institutional development, seem feasible and increasingly in 
demand. This is due to the ‘synergibility’ of theories, as they ‘toutes contiennent des ressources 
qui sont exploitables selon les questions que soulève la recherche empirique’ (Lequesne 1998: 
104). At least, it should remain desirable for the CFSP scholars to meet this challenge and to 
strive for more systematic, and more complex, theoretical frameworks with the objective to better 
understand and explain what the complex processes in the foreign policy cooperation in the EU 
induce.
5  
         To approach the construction of one such synergetic model, the next sections specify the 
dimensions that need to be considered for a fuller CFSP explanation, and bring them together into 
a single analytical model. Moreover, an attempt is undertaken to explain why the selected theories 
are complementary and how they fit into the identified dimensions. 
 
Beyond uni-causality: identifying dimensions for synergetic CFSP analysis 
 
Any analytical model that aspires to explain a complex subject matter such as the development of 
the CFSP institutions must not ignore the various forces at work. It should also operate along the 
decision-making  process  and  along  the  causal  flow.  For  the  former,  the  international  forces, 
mainly  in  the  form  of  changes  in  international  structure  and/or  in  security  situations  and 
pressures,  clearly  influence  (positively  or  negatively)  the  CFSP  development.  Integration 
pressures, however, are not only systemic. They can also be regional, e.g. European. For example, 
specific European security problems may have an impact on CFSP development as well. 
                                                           
     
4 Some other scholars also conducted pioneer work in this direction, though not with regard to integration dynamics 
(for example Gehring 1995, Giering 1997, or  Wolf 1997), or suggested that explanations of integration need several EI 
theories (Laursen 1993). There also seems to be identity-based explanations of the CFSP which, as some constructivists 
claim, when examining this object of analysis, the ‘the CFSP might […] be better understood in terms of identity 
creation’ (Tonra 2003: 738) and not as a function of international or functional pressures. On the latter, see especially 
Tonra and Christiansen (2004) and Jørgensen (2004a), and generally on constructivism, see Aalberts and Munster van 
(2003), Adler (1997), Dessler (1999), Haas (2001), Risse (2004), Wendt (1999), Wilga (2001) or Zehfuss (1997). 
     
5 Some academic input to synergetic undertakings provided Easton’s system theory (1965). By seeking to integrate 
integration theories, also Giering proposed an interesting research direction on this subject (see Giering 1997).  
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        Neither the international nor the European factors however automatically translate into the 
CFSP’s institutional built-up. Rather, the latter is always the subject of negotiations between the 
heads of governments of EU member states. Thus, the ultimate CFSP institutional morphology is 
also  contingent  upon  the  domestic  specificities  of  the  negotiating  parties,  and  upon  their 
negotiating powers.   
  All in all, whereas  the first two forces – at the international and European level – are 
responsible for creating the pressures to which the EU member states are exposed, i.e. they are 
the engines in developing the CFSP, the latter – the negotiations – represent a sort of ‘filter’ for 
the political decisions about what is necessary, and what is not, on the EU level. This in turn 
depends on the domestically defined interests and positions of the EU member states. Briefly, the 
former is considered as a necessary condition and the latter as a sufficient condition for the CFSP 
development. 
  Given  this  constellation,  an  analytical  model  of  synergetic  nature  shall  account  for  the 
‘forces’ and the ‘filter’ at the same time. Such a model must thus be eclectic in that it has to 
combine all dimensions, which cover and control for different forces at work. Hence, it represents 
at the theoretical level an attempt to link ‘explanatory concepts into a meaningful framework 
[which…] is not yet in evidence, [although] the field has the potential to move in that direction’ 
(Ginsberg 1999: 450). 
Building  a  synergetic  framework  should  consider  two  additional  arguments.  First,  the 
integration  theories  do  not  ‘respect’  the  distinction  between  external  and  internal  integration 
factors in the sense that they define the former as dominant, and ignore the latter or vice versa. At 
the same time, however, scholars somehow instinctively agree that both are relevant in the overall 
European integration process (M. E. Smith 2003, Jørgensen 1999, Sjursen 2003: 1), not only in 
the  case  of  EFP.  Following  this  general  argument,  it  seems  necessary  –  if  not  ontologically 
pertinent – to construct a more synergetic analytical model that adequately accounts for both the 
external and the internal dimension. 
         Secondly,  although  the  academic  world  appears  divided  into  competing  theoretical 
traditions, in the real world, real actors are exposed to various forces simultaneously, and (have 
to) combine various logics in their actions. This fact demands, as Risse argues, that future models 
and ‘theories of European integration should strive to integrate the various logics of social action 
and resulting propositions about human behaviours in order to figure out in which ways they 
complement each other’ (Risse 2004: 175).  
         Relating the above thoughts to CFSP studies, it appears pertinent to argue that the causes for 
the CFSP institutional built-up permanently oscillate between (1) the national foreign policies and 
the CFSP, in the interplay between (2) the CFSP and the international system, between (3) the 
international  system  and  the  national  foreign  policies  and,  finally,  and  between  (4)  the 
international system and the European system as a whole. Here, the first set of interaction, that 
between national policies and the CFSP, is probably particularly interesting as the member states 
are the ultimate decision makers in this policy area. However, the second and third dimensions 
operate as inputs for change, and the fourth constitutes an addition.
6 In this way, a synergetic 
analytical model has to combine at least the three first dimensions, and shall structure any eclectic 
analysis in this study field. These dimensional perspectives are illustrated in figure 1.  
  Following  this  dimensional  logic,  the  examination  would  begin  with  the  international 
system  and  its  relevant  elements.  That  would  allow  for  the  examination  of  when,  and  how 
changes in the international dimension influence EU member states in their decisions to develop 
the CFSP. The most suitable theory for this purpose would be the modified neorealist approach 
(MNR), because it suggests that it is the structural causes, as in classical neorealism, and security 
                                                           
      
6 The latter may be classified as an addition for it has only a minor effect on the constitutional changes in the CFSP. 
One could search solely for input of some EU level actors (e.g. the CFSP High Representative) exercised on the 
member states or from a feedback effect. The latter perspective is widely developed in the Europeanisation literature 
(see for example Sjursen 2000, Tonra 2001, Torreblanca 2001).  
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pressures from the international level, that are the main forces behind state behaviour. If the 
CFSP were to evolve, then these two elements must be transformed into specific political action 
in EU member states. However, as the simple existence of these two elements may not always be 
sufficient for any conceivable change in the CFSP, it would arguably be correct to assume that 
the modified neorealist theory would not in itself explain the specific final shape and current form 
of the CFSP which member states have agreed upon, such as during the time period from the 
Amsterdam Treaty to the 2003/4 IGC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Following the overall argument in this paper, if the analysis remains exclusively based on 
the MNR, two relevant analytical dimensions would be ignored and excluded from the analysis. 
Additionally,  given  that  the  outcomes  in  the  CFSP  are  more  than  just  classical  alliance-like 
cooperation,  the  internal  (European)  dimension  would  need  to  be  included.  Here,  the 
neofunctionalist approach would fit well because the CFSP’s considerable growth in scope and 
institutions over the last two decades (i.e. since the SEA) to a large extent and without much 
empirical  analysis  of  the  causes,  would  confirm  one’s  expectation  from  a  neofunctionalist 
prediction,  i.e.  that  the  EU  foreign  policy  would  go  beyond
7  the  point  of  pure 
intergovernmentalism.
8  Thus,  possibly  not  only  the  specific  international  but  also  European 
forces, which may partly result from the latter, may have contributed to the evolution of the EU 
foreign  policy  institutions.  Contrary  to  uni-causal  approaches,  a  synergetic  model  would  not 
exclude this dimension. 
                                                           
     
7 To provide but one example here, one could reiterate Vawrick’s queries: why did one observe an intensification of 
the relationship between the EU and the WEU? Why were the WEU institutions eventually subsumed by the EU? 
Perhaps the spillover mechanism was at work (Vawrick 1998: 18/Fn 2). 
     
8  On  different  forms  of  intergovernmentalism  and  their  analytical  implications  for  the  EU  foreign  policy,  see 
Jørgensen (1999). 
Source: Adapted from Jørgensen (2004: 34, see also Jørgensen 1999: 90) 
 
Figure 1: The CFSP and dimensional perspectives 
European system 
    CFSP institutional built-up 
 
National Foreign Policies 
 
International system 
  
 
9 
9 
           According to the dimensional model, the international and European forces need to be 
complemented by domestic and European negotiations rounds, in which the EU member states 
ultimately decide upon the final the CFSP institutional morphology. Since this logic invariably 
follows the respective domestic debates on the subject matter, this dimension can be well served 
by an analysis based upon LI. Regardless of the degree to which the EU member states may be 
exposed to structural and agency-based causes at the international and European level, they are – 
to  different  degrees  –  hesitant  or  even  opposed  to  any  move  in  pooling  power  in  this  ‘high 
politics’ area. Since these are the key actors involved in constructing the CFSP at the European 
level, they ultimately decide about the institutional ‘physiognomy’ of the CFSP in successive 
IGCs.  This  consideration  would  be  a  focal  point  in  the  dimensional  model,  irrespective  of 
theoretical perspective taken for the constructed synergetic model.  
 
From single analytical dimensions to synergetic analytical sequences 
 
One of the ambitions of this paper is to present a viable combination of different theoretical 
approaches. Assuming that the CFSP explanation is optimised by combining them, the selected 
theories  thus  need  to  be  framed  within  a  single  synergetic  analytical  model  that  fits  into  a 
coherent and complementary theoretical design. The positive trade-off of such a design seems to 
be that a combination of theories is probably more suitable for the complementary explanation of 
the  CFSP’s  institutional  development  than  individual  approaches  (Sandholtz  1996:  405,  427; 
Peterson 1995). 
        The question of complementarity of theories in the literature is nebulous. Some attempts 
have been undertaken to make theories of European integration complementary.
9 Even in the EU 
foreign policy field, a number of scholars suggested that synergies may be necessary (Koenig-
Archibugi  2004:  168,  Sedelmeier  2003:  21,  Carlsneas  2004:  12-15).  Although  the  overall 
academic  environment  is  based  on  theoretical  competition  –  and t his  competition  inevitably 
pertains also to CFSP studies – synergies and complementarities between theories are possible. 
          Given  the  above,  an  obvious  question  is  what  makes  the  selected  theories,  commonly 
understood  as  rather  competing,  complementary?  Two  arguments  seem  appropriate.  First,  as 
already hinted, different theories focus ontologically on different elements and just by doing so, 
their respective explanations are based only on the chosen element(s). For example, external 
factors or international structure are studied by realist approaches, or typically internal factors are 
examined  with  neofunctionalist  or  intergovernmental  approaches.  Combining  the  selected 
theories,  and  constructing  a  synergetic  model  allows  for  a  balanced  consideration  of  both 
ontological foci, which do not exclude, but complement one another.  
Second, transforming the simple, above-mentioned, dimensions into successive analytical 
sequences  and  along  the  causal  flow  may  make  the  complementarity  between  the  selected 
theories even more clear. Its transformed sequential nature allows taking stock of factors external 
to, and inherent within, the CFSP institutional building, one after another in a systematic way. In 
this respect, some scholars reflected on such a possibility.
10 Concerning the EPC and then the 
CFSP, M. E. Smith argued that 
 
                                                           
      
9 For the most prominent examples see Peterson and Bomberg (1999), Peterson’s model (1995, 2001), Ginsberg 
(1999, 2001), Schumann (1991, 1997), Croisat and Quermonne (1999), Giering (1997), Busch (1998, 2001), Moravcsik 
(1993, 1997a, 1998, 2003), Beach (2000) or Sjursen (2003). 
       
10 For example, M. E. Smith (2003) considered different forces as being concomitantly responsible for member 
states’ efforts to create and further ‘engineer’ the CFSP. M. E. Smith pointed to a ‘combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors [which have] further encouraged the institutionalisation of these efforts at the EU level’ (M. E. 
Smith 2003: 3). Furthermore, as he continued, ‘the EU adapts to pressures for institutional change for insights into the 
prospects for reform in this domain’ (ibid.).  
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     this policy domain can be understood in terms of a sequential process of institutional development 
involving intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational elements […]. [Hereby,] exogenous 
forces,  such  as  enlargements,  typically  provide  only  a  window  of  opportunity  for  debate  over 
institutional change; they do not determine the specific outcome. [Similarly,] endogenous processes 
within the EU foreign policy structures (chiefly learning-by-doing and imitation) generally provide the 
range  of  possible  options.  Reforms  [thus]  tend  to  reflect  a  balance  between  pragmatic  operational 
concerns and enduring ideological/legal debates within the EU (M. E. Smith 2003: 3).  
 
        As  figure  2  illustrates,  the  first  sequence  relates  to  factors  such  as  changes  in  the 
international structure and alterations of security pressures to which the EU member states are 
exposed. The chain of causality runs here from the international level to the EU member states. 
This  is  represented  by  arrow  number  1.  Arrow  number  2  represents  the  endogenous  factors 
present within the EU system itself. Here, the causal link is formed from the European forces to 
the national foreign policies. This is where the policies of the EU member states towards the 
CFSP and its institutions are influenced by the European system. Hereby, national debates are 
instigated, as neofunctionalism suggests, by the general neofunctionalist forces which are present 
within the institutions. And finally, arrow number 3 characterises the ways in which the specific 
international and European forces, which are domestically ‘digested’ and then defined by the 
foreign  policies  of  the  individual  member  states,  are  eventually  translated  into  the  final 
institutional morphology of the CFSP via continuous European negotiations. This mechanism 
comes full circle with the decisions taken in IGCs and national ratification processes.  
Having identified the relevant dimensions and levels in the synergetic analytical model, one 
needs to fill its sequences with theoretical substance necessary for uncovering the specific causal 
forces in the individual sequences. Hence, independent variables of theories need to be filtered 
Source: Wilga 2007: 128 
Figure 2: The CFSP analytical model and its sequences 
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out. Although theories have already been selected, their individual theoretical potentials have not 
yet been explored. This task is undertaken in the next section. 
 
EI theories and their turf-ground sequences  
 
First sequence: MNR and international dynamics 
 
Following the arrows from Figure 2, the first move (arrow 1) in the analytical model consists of 
the reflections based upon the MNR. This theoretical approach draws upon the first-cut neorealist 
theory of European integration developed by Wivel (2000, 2001).
11 Although belonging to the 
realist tradition, one of the basic MNR claims is modified. It seeks to show that both the character 
of international anarchy and the intensity of security pressures can vary in a region, and that this 
can contribute to integration (or to disintegration) in the given region. The parameter explaining 
this variation is the probability - and not the sheer possibility - of conflict, as classical neo-realists 
assume.
12 Accordingly then, if the probability of conflict is lower in a given region, the state(s) in 
question are less concerned with its (their) short-term security needs. 
        As more than an international regime,
13 an international alliance, or a conventional case of 
multilateral cooperation from the 1970s to the 1980s (Pijpers 1990, 1991), the CFSP institutions 
can be analysed with the MNR in the first sequence of the model.
14 Important for this theory is 
the fact that the security needs depend upon the structure of the international system and the 
geographical location of the state(s) at hand,
15 both the one exposed to the conflict and the one 
causing it. Based on these elements, the MNR offers insights into states behaviour depending on 
the probability of conflict and the level of instability. As Wivel assumes, regional economic and 
then political integration occurs only among states that face a low probability of conflict with 
each other, i.e. are placed in a zone of peace as opposed to a zone of conflict (see table 2). 
 
Table 2: Probability of conflict and probability of integration 
Zone  Probability of conflict  Probability of integration  Likely outcome 
Zone of conflict  high  low  fragmentation 
Zone of peace   low  high  integration 
Source: Wivel (2000: 183) 
                                                           
     
11 The term ‘modified realist version’ (MNR) has been introduced by Anders Wivel and used in his study of 
European integration (Wivel 2000). For a more extensive discussion on, and for more on the understanding of, different 
versions of realism, see Wivel (2000: 105-146). 
     
12 This is the main dividing line between different realist branches. See especially Brooks (1997). 
     
13 As international regime theories would suggest, such form of cooperation could only be assumed as ‘sets of 
implicit  or  explicit  principles,  norms,  rules,  and  decision-making  procedures  around  which  actors’  expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1982: 2). 
     
14  The  modified  version  of  neorealism  finds  its  origins  already  in  the  Munich  school  of  realism  –  known  as 
‘synoptischer Realismus’ (Kindermann 1985, 1991) as well as in the debates among the neorealists themselves (Brooks 
1997). It was also used in studies of the German foreign policy conducted by scholars from the so called ‘Tübinger 
Gruppe’. For the latter, see in particular Rittberger (2001). 
     
15 This links the global and the regional level to each other (Wivel 2002).  
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In the absence of a danger to their security concerns, states try to enhance their power by 
focusing  on  long-term  economic  achievements.  As  a  first  step  toward  integration,  their 
participation  in  integration  projects  is  ‘rational  because  the  free-trade  arrangements  reduce 
transaction costs, enhance the possibility of taking advantage of economies of scale and reduce 
the  risk  of  monopolization  and  thereby  enhance  the  economic  strength  and  welfare  of  the 
participants’ (Wivel 2000: 152). This in turn enhances their security, their relative power and 
finally their possibilities to collectively defend themselves when confronted with external security 
threats, which may arise outside in zones of conflict at a later point in time. This reasoning forms 
the  link  between  the  probability  of  conflict  outside  a  zone  of  peace  and  the  possibility  of 
cooperation in foreign policy between states within the same zone of peace.  
The latter reasoning is further contingent upon the structure of the international system. For 
simplicity’s  sake  one  can  make  a  tripartite  distinction  between  ‘multipolarity’  (no  power), 
‘bipolarity’ (two great powers), and ‘unipolarity’ (a single superpower). For the analysis of the 
CFSP, bipolarity is more important since Europe and the institutional beginnings of the CFSP in 
the form of the EPC fell into this type of polarity. Later, especially after the end of the Cold War, 
the CFSP’s existence may be viewed as operating within either unipolarity or multiplicity, with 
different effects on integration (see table 3).  
 
 
Table 3: Polarity’s impact and effect on regional integration 
Polarity  Multipolarity  Bipolarity  Unipolarity 
Impact  moderate   high  very high 
Effect  non-integration  integration  integration 
Source: Wivel (2000: 198) 
The argument here is that bipolarity produces economic integration between states in the 
same geographical region (for example in Europe), because their security interests are secondary 
due  to  the  efforts  of  the  big  powers.  With  lowered  concerns  about  security,  states  may 
concentrate on other instruments to increase their power by seeking to enhance their integration, 
as well as in political (foreign policy) matters. 
In a unipolar or multipolar world order, the dynamics are less clear than those in bipolarity. 
For example, it might happen that eventually the remaining superpower is balanced by a group of 
states. As some scholars point out, it is only a matter of time before a new form of bipolar system 
emerges  (Layne  1993).
16  However,  a  more  important  feature  of  this  form  of  international 
structure is that increasing instability outside a zone of peace may induce the states within the 
peace zone to cooperate more intensively without necessarily re-storing a bipolar system.  
 
Second sequence: NF and European dynamics 
 
NF’s contribution could consist of assisting an analysis of the CSFP in the second move of the 
model  (arrow  2).  The  sources  of  national  preference  formation  are  neither  exclusively 
international, as the previous sequence suggests, nor exclusively domestic. They may also be 
                                                           
    
16 While the explanations can be several, the most often cited are (1) the exhaustion of hegemony; (2)  overextension 
of the superpower, or (3) differential growth rates of states (see Wivel 2000: 164-68, 2001: 9-12).  
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regional.  The  EU  might  have  a  causal  effect  on  how  the  preferences  of  member  states  are 
formed.
17 NF may illuminate some of the puzzles here, in part because the CFSP is essentially a 
case of transfer of competences. This involves both a modest expansion of supranationality in the 
CFSP machinery, as well as an expansion of scope in this policy field (Wilga 2007: chapter 3). 
   Although NF finds its origins among non-state-centric approaches and thus draws upon 
functionalism and IR liberal elements,
18 neofunctionalists have claimed repeatedly in their works 
that integration is about functionally organised societies coming closer together. According to 
their nature, their needs may produce integration demands,
19 which through a negotiation-based 
(political) ‘spillover’ would, as neofunctionalists argued, affect more and more sectors in the 
integration process, including foreign policy.  
   Due to problems with spillover,
20 NF founders declared their theory obsolete in the 1970s 
(Haas 1975). However, other scholars such as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), Mutimer (1989), 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991) or Corbey (1995), added several improvements to this theory.
21 With 
them, improved neofunctionalism provided interesting ideas e.g. about the growing scope of the 
CFSP, and its expanding institutional machinery. In particular, there is a tendency for economic 
and social decisions to spill over into the realm of the ‘political’, due to ‘the indirect penetration 
of the political by the “purely” economic […] decisions [which almost always acquire] political 
significance in the minds of the participants’ (Haas 1986: 152). 
          In the above context foreign and security policy may also be relevant, especially because it 
may help ensure collective European profits and protect it from external instabilities of diverse 
nature.  For  this  to  be  effective,  further  political  integration  would  have  to  continue,  and  go 
beyond simple common trade and common monetary policy. The most appropriate instrument for 
accomplishing  this  objective  is  foreign  policy,  since  it  can  best  impact  on  the  external 
environment in a manner conducive to the single market and the common currency.
22 
          If the latter is true, then one could speculate about the level of politicisation resulting from 
internal debates on this issue, as well as on the influence of such politicisation on the CFSP 
institution-building, in particular in the time of the existence of the CFSP institutions. Here, for 
example, the problem of inconsistency between the economic and political aspects of foreign 
relations has frequently played a role in those debates (Schmalz 1998, Wessel 2000). Linked to 
the first sequence, in cases where the economic integration is advanced and the probability of 
external  conflict  arises,  the  parties  participating  in  foreign  policy  integration  project  would 
probably prefer to respond to such instabilities in a concerted action via common institutions. 
Modified  neorealism  does  not  spell  out  this  condition.  It  refers  only  to  the  changes  in  the 
international structures as a motor for action.  
    Coming back to the politicisation level, it can be characterised by a cumulative tendency in 
which  national  actors  get  involved  over  time  in  more  and  more  policy  areas,  and  as  a 
consequence find themselves ‘gradually embroiled in ever more salient and controversial areas of 
policymaking’ (Schmitter 1969: 166). In exploring this process, Schmitter defined politicisation 
as  ‘a  process  whereby  the  controversiality  of  joint  decision-making  goes  up,  [leading]  to  a 
                                                           
     
17  This  is  confirmed  by  the  literature  on  Europeanisation.  See  for  example  Sjursen  (2000),  Tonra  (2001)  or 
Torreblanca (2001).  
     
18 Functionalism – the forerunner of neofunctionalism – does not directly apply to integration but is still interesting 
in many ways (see Mitrany 1946, 1948, 1975). For more on both functionalism and its ‘neo-’ version, see Zellentin 
(1992).   
    
19 For this point, see Mattli (1999a). For a broader discussion on ‘integration demand’ and ‘supply’, see also Mattli 
(1999b). 
     
20 Spillover forces can also have a damaging effect on integration. They can exist in the form of a ‘spill-back’, a 
‘retrench’ (Busch 1996) or as, what Jäger and Lange (2001: 115f) call, ‘desintegrativer Spillover’. 
     
21 Despite these theoretical necessities, neofunctionalism, as some recent studies have demonstrated, still holds (see 
Stone and Sandholtz 1997, Sandholtz and Stone 1998, 1999). 
     
22 Examples abound here: ‘Wider Europe’, ‘Barcelona process’, ‘Northern dimension’, common strategies towards 
Russia or towards Ukraine, etc.   
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widening of the audience or clientele interested and active in integration [and to] a manifest 
redefinition of mutual objectives’ (ibid.: 166, emphasis in original). Possibly, the clearest case of 
politicisation occurs during a shift from formally economic to manifestly political goals by a 
collective  recognition  that  ‘the  original  objectives  have  been  attained,  surpassed,  or  made 
irrelevant and that new ones involving an upward shift in either scope or level of commitment are 
operative’ (ibid.). And here it can eventually come to the expansion of scope and level. This 
process has been existent in the CFSP for years (say, from Maastricht to the 2003/4 IGC), and 
obviously is still affecting the institutional built-up of the CFSP (Wilga 2007: chapter 9).  
The same process can also be reinforced by externalisation and demand side. As another 
neofunctionalist argued, ‘whatever the original intentions, as integration proceeds member states 
will be increasingly forced to hammer out a collective external position vis-à-vis third parties 
because the further integration proceeds, the more third parties will react to it, either by support or 
by  hostility’  (Nye  1994:  298).  It  is  one  of  the  most  important  neofunctional  hypotheses 
concerning external relations and foreign policy. Once some states begin an integration project in 
whatever  area,  the  ‘participants  will  find  themselves  compelled––regardless  of  their  original 
intentions––to adopt common policies vis-à-vis nonparticipant third countries’ (Schmitter 1969: 
165) and common institutions.
23  
Following this neofunctionalist logic, one could expect that ‘[g]iven a minimal threshold of 
initial  commitment  and  joint  policymaking,  regional  actors,  for  a  variety  of  voluntary  and 
involuntary motives, will find themselves engaged in the elaboration of a common foreign and 
security policy where none existed previously’ (Schmitter 1969: 165). This may even be more the 
case  when  instability  outside  the  EU  grows.  In  such  situations,  various  external  actors  may 
demand  the  EU  to  give  assistance,  in  whatever  terms,  or  internal  actors  may  ask  for 
improvements  in  EFP  institutions  in  order  to  meet  the  external  challenges  and  the  external 
demands. However, it may also happen that external demand will lead to a deadlock.  
 
Third sequence: LI and domestic and European debates 
 
For the third move (arrow 3), the developed model uses the LI. As Wivel admits, the MNR 
‘turn[s] the blind eye to the intra-regional dynamics’ (Wivel 2000: 358), thereby neglecting the 
fact that within Europe there are also states. And the international system (even though of single 
source - anarchy) has diverging effects on different EU member states (Koenig-Archibugi 2004). 
Since the EU does not have exclusive competence in foreign policy, the EU member states cannot 
react as a single unit.  
Given  the  variation  in  reacting  to  the  external  pressures  –  be  it  international  conflicts, 
terrorist attacks or others – the EU member states have different interests in proceeding on the 
path to integrating their national foreign policies, which cannot be properly explained by realism 
(Koenig-Archibugi  2004,  M.  E.  Smith  2004:  20-21).  These  differences  and  interests  are 
cumulatively translated into the institutional built-up of the CFSP. Clearly, although EU member 
states react to different international events in the way they find appropriate and conform to their 
respective national interests,
24 this does not automatically mean that the outcome is the smallest 
common denominator. What is true, however, is that whatever the institutional outcome, this 
occurs – as LI suggests – according to the logic of asymmetric interdependence.  
This ‘simple logic of “asymmetrical interdependence”––those who benefit the most from a 
policy  must  sacrifice  the  most  on  the  margin––is  the  most  profound  factor  shaping  the   
negotiations’ (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002: 3, see also Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). 
                                                           
     
23 Indeed, as Haas observed, the member states of the Six ‘were obliged to work out a common economic and 
commercial policy toward the United States, Latin America and Africa earlier than planned in order to be able to 
present a common front in GATT’ (Haas 1986: 163). 
     
24  This  may  concern  many  policy  areas  and  many  different  foreign  policy  issues. A   different  but  interesting 
perspective than the negotiation-based liberal intergovernmentalism offers the ‘adaptation approach’ (Petersen 1998).  
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Therefore, in order to account for the final shape of the CFSP – the latter being a subject of 
continuous negotiations between the EU member states – this logic must be integrated into the 
analytical model.  
  In a reversed order, as figure 3 shows, LI is ultimately about institutional choice. It is about 
what the EU member states decide in IGCs or on other occasions in the Council of Ministers. 
This institutional-choice stage is an outcome of the first two stages. On the first LI stage, EU 
member  states  are  more  occupied  with  their  interests  at  the  domestic  level.  These  internal, 
sometimes polarised, debates take place ‘at home’ between opposition and government in power. 
These positions on specific CFSP issues are negotiated later at the European level. Already at this 
point the respective positions are results of concerns expressed by the governments in power 
about  different  international  and  European  questions.  Different  issues  –  each  having  causal 
effects – such as anarchy, security pressures, as well as the specific European considerations, 
already play a role at this stage (Wilga 2003: 26, Wilga 2006: 343).  
 
 
        Once the governments in power take positions at the national level, the second stage, i.e. the 
European negotiations, begins. This does not mean that the domestic political phase is over, 
though. The debates may well continue despite the positions taken. Nonetheless, those decisions 
become the subject of negotiations at the EU level despite the possible ongoing domestic debates. 
At  this  stage,  the  negotiations  depend  upon  two  factors,  i.e.  the  power  capabilities  of  the 
respective EU member states and the asymmetrical interdependence of the negotiating parties. 
          Obviously, any decision enlarging the institutional built-up of the CFSP is more likely, the 
more member states are favourable to such an option during the bargaining game at the EU level. 
And obviously, if there is no majority of states in favour of creating new CFSP institutions, then 
one would expect at this stage to see different constellations of pro-CFSP states using – in unison 
or in isolation – diverse negotiation strategies, such as side payments and package deals, to ensure 
the decision about creating new CFSP institutions. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
2. Bargained outcomes 
between major EU 
member states’ 
governments 
1. National preferences of major 
governments concerning 
THE CFSP creation and 
development  
3. Choice of institutional shape 
    for the CFSP based on  
    bargained outcomes 
Figue 3: Liberal intergovernmentalist framework  
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Preparing for empirical analysis: model-based expectations for the CFSP development 
 
Having identified theoretical content for all three analytical moves, empirical examination would 
need some model based expectations. Beginning with the MNR, the simplest hypothesis could be: 
the stronger the security pressures on the CFSP institutions, the more pressure would be placed on 
the EU member states to react to them. Possibly, as a result EU member states would collectively 
respond to the security pressures either by using available conflict prevention instruments or, a 
posteriori, by creating new, or by improving the existing, EU (collective security) institutional 
arrangements.  Thus  the  MNR  would  predict  that  the  probability  of  closer  foreign  policy 
cooperation in the EC/EU would increase with decreasing probability of conflict in the EU, and 
increasing probability of conflict outside the EU.  
Concerning the type of anarchy, which is the MNR’s second identified variable, one could 
argue that the change from bipolarity into unipolarity would increase the pressure on the EU to 
improve their common foreign policy institutions, i.e. the EPC. At that time, not only a change of 
international structure occurred, but also the instabilities in Europe significantly increased. If 
having an impact at all, one could expect some form of additional institutional arrangements in 
order to meet the external challenges. Thus, upgrading the EPC institutions to the CFSP can be 
seen as a form of collective policy to obstruct the shift from long- to short-term security concerns.  
  As to the second sequence in the model, two independent variables were identified. Relating 
to the NF process ‘whereby members of an integration scheme – agreed on some collective goals 
for a variety of motives but [were] unequally satisfied with [the] (…) attainment of these goals – 
[they would] attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, 
related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment 
to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both’ (Schmitter 1969: 162). 
Accordingly, as there was rather little change in level but much more (increase) in the scope of 
the CFSP, these changes may exactly have resulted from increasing dissatisfaction of some EU 
member states about the common foreign policy institutions. Evidence would thus be needed that 
some  member  states  were  dissatisfied  with the  EPC,  and  then the  CFSP  as  a  foreign  policy 
instrument. Additionally, one would have to find evidence for politicisation processes, serving the 
expansion of the CFSP’s institutional basis. Equally, the externalisation and demand may have 
been intensified or reduced by the pressure for institutional improvements in the CFSP, especially 
where third actors demanded CFSP performance. 
  Given the above, the NF independent variables would assume that the probability of closer 
foreign policy cooperation, i.e. the CFSP institutional evolution, would increase with a growing 
level of dissatisfaction, and later politicisation caused by emerging or existing security pressures 
and with a high, or at least a medium level, of externalisation effect and conducive of demand. 
Taking the reflections based upon LI, one would need to consider the domestic debates and 
positions of the major EU member states on specific EPC/CFSP institutional problems. Second, 
one  would  have  to  assess  the  respective  negotiation  powers  in  light  of  asymmetric 
interdependence during the ongoing controversies among the EU member states. Thus, the more 
intensive such issues are discussed in the domestic arena, the probability increases that they are 
discussed at the EU level. At that state, the more states are in favour of changes in the CFSP 
institutional structures, the more probable it also becomes to force them through at the European 
level in IGCs. To be more precise, at the first stage of LI logic, one would need to find evidence 
for  willingness  among  the  EU  member  states  to  improve  foreign  policy  institutions  defined 
explicitly  in  the  national  preferences  of  at  least  two  of  the  largest  member  states,  although 
sometimes already one can be sufficient.
25 It would however be more realistic to assume that a 
                                                           
     
25 Although not in relation to foreign policy areas, Laursen showed (1993: 233) that even though two large EU 
member states were opposed to some relevant propositions during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the decisions 
have been taken anyway. In Laursen’s own words, ‘why [was] co-decision for the parliament [decided upon] if two of 
the three were opposed? Why more cohesion money, if two of the three were opposed? And why, in the end, did the  
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positive decision of three large states would secure changes in the CFSP, especially when large 
EU  member  states  use  their  bargaining  powers  to  push  through  decisions  conducive  to 
strengthening their common foreign policy institutions, or to block any initiative leading to its 
damage.  
 
 
Table 4. Theories and expectations concerning the CFSP development 
 
Necessary condition 
 
Necessary condition 
 
Sufficient condition 
 
MNR  NF  LI 
- Changes in international 
structure (polarity type: PT), 
existing security pressures 
(SP), uncertainties and 
instabilities endangering 
integration 
- Spillover-based dissatisfaction 
and politicisation (DP) in THE 
CFSP, externalisation and 
demand side (EDS) from 
involved actors 
- Relative agreement among the 
large EU members in domestic 
debates (DD), side payments 
to opposing states in European 
negotiations (EN) 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
On the basis of the above theoretical considerations (see table 4), the overall, synergetic, 
expectation concerning the CFSP development could be as follows: the CFSP institutions evolve 
as a result of pressures caused by the given PT and SP, by existent DP and EDS, and sufficient 
DD, producing national positions and the EN taking place and eventually leading to changes in 
the CFSP in the period under investigation. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This short text had a twofold task. First, it was to develop an argument for a more synergetic 
approach to the CFSP studies as the field characterised by a multitude of uni-causal analyses, 
which may seem insufficient to analyse the complexity of the object of study. Second, the text 
offered a new synergetic – multi-causal and multi-level – CFSP analytical model.  
To achieve this, the paper proceeded in several steps. It first identified three integration 
theories to study the CFSP. Arguing that these EI theories are examples of uni-causality, the 
paper went beyond uni-causality, thereby identifying dimensions for a synergetic CFSP analysis. 
It was followed by a second step, i.e. from static CFSP dimensions to dynamic CFSP analytical 
sequences. The paper also argued for complementarity of the selected EI theories, and developed 
a number of model-based expectations.  
The  model  is  based  upon  elements  of  three  integration  theories,  namely  (1)  modified 
neorealism,  (2)  neofunctionalism  and  (3)  liberal  intergovernmentalism.  By  juxtaposing  those 
theories in sequences, the new model uses the respective theoretical advantages and facilitates 
argumentation for a synergetic analysis.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[Maastricht] Treaty include new competences in the area of consumer protection, if two of the three were opposed’ 
(ibid.: 232).  
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